The 2017 Venice Commission opinion on the Turkish constitutional reform raised serious concerns as to the independence of judges in Turkey after the constitutional revision that year.34 A particular source of concern was the new composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which has the power to appoint, dismiss, transfer, promote and adopt disciplinary measures against judges. For the Council of State, Article 155 of the Turkish Constitution provides that the Council of Judges and Prosecutors shall appoint ¾ of the members, while the remaining ¼ shall be appointed by the President of the Republic. The 2017 opinion found that the changes to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors’ composition were “extremely problematic”, as the President of the Republic would in effect control the appointments to and thus the composition of the Council.35 The opinion noted that according to Article 159 of the Turkish Constitution, the President appoints 6 of the Council’s 13 members, while the remaining 7 members are appointed by the Grand National Assembly. Since parliamentary and presidential elections are held simultaneously, the Venice Commission found it highly likely that the President through his or her party will exert considerable influence over the Grand National Assembly’s choice of the remaining members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
34 See CDL-AD(2017)005, par. 110-123.
35 See CDL-AD(2017)005, par. 119.
