There are many different ways to supervise and enforce political party and campaign finance provisions, and it is in principle up to the state to determine which body or bodies to charge with this task. At the same time, the Guidelines state that “[w]hichever body is tasked with regulation should be nonpartisan in nature and meet requirements of independence and impartiality”. The draft law places the Oversight and Audit Service of the Electoral Commission at the heart of the supervision over financial activities of political parties. However, it is noted that the Electoral Code (Article 29) does not clearly define the status of the Oversight and Audit Service (OAS). The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR have previously emphasised the advantage of independent institutional oversight over campaign financing and recommended to clarify in the Electoral Code the institutional status of the OAS. In this regard, it is important to recall the 2012 Final Report for the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Armenia, recommending that the “Oversight and Audit Service could have a more proactive approach in order to ensure transparent reporting by all contestants. The nomination of auditors by political parties should be mandatory; the costs could be covered from the state budget”44. Consideration may also be given to, in Article 31, equipping the oversight body with a number of additional powers in this area, such as, for example, the power to call witnesses under oath, and the power to ask other governmental institutions (tax authorities, anti-corruption authorities, etc.) for assistance in carrying out its work, including through the provision of information or expertise.