Although the Vice-President is supposed to serve as the acting President on a temporary basis, there is no time-limit – except for the length of the mandate itself – imposed in case of temporary absence of the President (as opposed to the 45-day limit in case of vacancy). Moreover, having the most powerful, and largely uncontrolled and uncontrollable, position in the country occupied by a non-elected person is problematic even when this occupation is only temporary. That is why in the United States, the Vice-President is elected together with the President and it is known in advance, and determined by the people, who the holder of this office will be. According to the Turkish authorities the amendments establish an “appropriate [...] connection of the legitimacy of Vice-presidents with that of the President directly elected by the nation”. In addition, they argue that the simultaneous election of the President and the Vice-president risks causing “the emergence of a double legitimacy crisis”. The Venice Commission cannot agree with these arguments. The President’s democratic legitimacy to exercise the executive power may not be considered as transferable, especially when there is no mechanism of democratic accountability of the “chosen” Vice-president. As regards the risk of a crisis of legitimacy between the President and the Vice-president, the Commission considers that the U.S. experience shows that the hierarchy established in the joint elections does not pose such a risk.