Home > 5.1.2 Referendum requested by an authority > VENEZUELA - ON THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY DECREE No. 2878 OF 23 MAY 2017 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON CALLING ELECTIONS TO A NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
 
 
 
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The TSJ’s decision does not address several other issues. First, while Articles 347 and 348 of the Venezuelan Constitution are unclear about the content and consequences of an initiative to call a National Constituent Assembly, according to Articles 341 § 3 and 344, constitutional amendments and major reforms should be submitted to referendum within 30 days following the congressional approval. If even these minor changes to the constitution are bound to be subject to a public consultation, then it can be reasonably assumed that its major renegotiation should be too. The same logic can be found in Articles 74 and 218, according to which partial or total abrogation of laws should be submitted to referendums. In the Venezuelan system, it is to be expected that in matters of supreme importance for the country, such as the adoption of a new Constitution, the ways allowing the people to express its opinion as broadly and directly as possible, are to be favoured. These encompass, but are not limited to, holding a national referendum on whether to establish the constituent national assembly or not (ex ante referendum), creating the assembly through public elections, and having the text of a new constitution approved or rejected in a national referendum (ex post referendum). Second, Decree 2878 does not allow for a democratic decision regarding the need to revisit the constitution. This could undermine the People’s “leadership” and “means of participation” in constituent initiatives (see Articles 5 and 70 of the Constitution). Third, the President’s direct call for a NCA assumes that only one of the Public Powers (i.e. the Executive Branch) has enough attributions to impose a renegotiation of the social contract, ignoring the other State organs through which the People of Venezuela exert their sovereignty (e.g. the National Assembly); this raises an issue in terms of democratic and egalitarian principles, and of the separation of powers, as stated in articles 1, 2, 5, 19, 21 and 136 of the Constitution. The Venezuelan President, as only one of the constituted powers, should not be entitled to call for a National Constituent Assembly without calling a referendum.