It should be noted that the significant increase in the number of CEC and DEC members, proposed to be 17 for each of these bodies, may in practice pose a challenge for the election administration, particularly in reaching decisions on a consensus basis, a preferable approach under international good practice. While a mixed composition structure for election management bodies is acceptable from an international perspective, enlarging the commissions as an apparent solution to a political crisis is arguably not an effective approach and may actually undermine the public’s trust in the election administration, particularly if it negatively impacts their professional work. In this respect, the ODIHR election observation report on the 2018 presidential election recommended that consideration be given to aligning the number of commission members at each level to the actual need. For PECs, this is addressed by the proposed amendments (see below) but for the CEC and DECs the number of members actually increased rather than decreased. Moreover, it should be noted that the proportion of non-partisan- versus party-appointed CEC/DEC members remains the same as under the current system, that is, just under 50 per cent are non-partisan appointees. In this regard, it is questionable why increasing the number of party appointees from six to nine and introducing the parity principle, which will provide a more pluralistic election administration, necessitated a proportionate increase in the number of non-partisan members, absent clear justification as to administrative need. This approach appears solely aimed at maintaining the same proportion of non-partisan/party appointees. In light of the low level of trust in the CEC/DECs due to widespread perceptions that their non-partisan members are ostensibly ruling party loyalists, maintaining the same proportion in their composition cannot serve to strengthen public confidence in the election administration