A minimum requirement is that the interference with the freedom of speech is clearly and precisely circumscribed in the law. While the notion of “false information” may in many cases be determined objectively, the wording “slander” refers to a highly subjective standard. In elections, information of a candidate’s morals and suitability for the office is clearly a relevant information for voters. Accordingly, the criminalisation of “slander” in the electoral context should be reconsidered, and at the minimum specified more clearly in a way to prevent arbitrary decisions and a chilling effect on the electoral debate and scrutiny of politicians. As for the notion of “false information”, the lawmakers may consider qualifying its application, for example by setting a higher threshold for proof, or by requiring that the false information be meant to serve an illegitimate aim of misleading the voters. The remit of Article 154.15 is limited somewhat as it appears to be aimed only at anonymous expressions such as anonymous accounts on social media. However, the wording “via information and communication technologies, anonymous source” is not very clear and may also refer to information that is retrieved from anonymous sources but published by identifiable individuals and groups. Moreover, there can be legitimate reasons in an electoral context for disclosing information about candidates anonymously or based on anonymous sources. The Venice Commission and the ODIHR therefore recommend clarifying the provision so that it does not interfere with legitimate aims, for example investigative media.