Freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 ECHR, in particular free discussion of political issues during electoral campaigns, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. Under Article 10(2) ECHR, restrictions are acceptable provided they are “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” for the pursuit of certain legitimate aims, including the protection of public order, national security, morals, or the reputation and rights of others. The existence of a legal basis has traditionally been broadly understood. The list of legitimate aims justifying a limitation of freedom of expression is exhaustive, and the limitations must be interpreted restrictively. Measures restricting freedom of expression are only justified where electoral discourse, assessed in its content and context, goes beyond legitimate criticism of migration and asylum policies and reaches a level of denigration, dehumanisation or stigmatisation of migrants, asylum seekers or refugees as individuals or as a vulnerable group that is sufficiently serious to interfere with their rights and dignity. The Court’s most thorough review concerns the third requirement, that is proportionality of the restrictions on freedom of expression in relation to the legitimate objectives pursued. A balance must be struck between the need to preserve the pluralism of political opinions, on the one hand, and the obligation of States to protect the rights and dignity of vulnerable people, as well as the integrity of the democratic and electoral process, on the other. At the same time, the integrity of the electoral process requires the pluralism of political opinions. Restrictive measures, in particular criminal sanctions, should intervene only when less intrusive ones cannot lead to the legitimate aim pursued.