III. DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT NATIONAL ELECTIONS LAW AND THE DRAFT ELECTION COMMISSIONS LAW

B. Limitation on Electoral Rights

The denial of suffrage, due to a conviction for any crime, is a questionable exercise of state power. The denial of suffrage should occur only where a person has been convicted of committing a crime of such a serious nature that forfeiture of political rights is indeed proportionate to the crime committed.[1] In Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2),[2] the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that a blanket restriction on the voting rights of prisoners, “irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances”, was a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court also observed that Article 3 of Protocol 1 “guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election”. The blanket prohibition in Article 3 would appear to be contrary to the principles stated in the Hirst case

[1] See, e.g., Paragraph 24 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document which provides that “participating States will ensure that the exercise of all the human rights and fundamental freedoms will not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law and are consistent with their obligations under international law”. See also, Paragraph 1.1(d.iv) of Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Guidelines for Elections, (2002), page 8.

[2] Hirst v. United Kingdom, no. 74025/01 (6 October 2005), available at www.echr.coe.int.