Home > 3.2 Proportional systems > GEORGIA - Opinion on the Draft Revised Constitution
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Paragraph 40

In the current context, the principle according to which the “winner takes all (unallocated mandates)” runs in part contrary to the proportional election system introduced by Article 37 para. 2 of the draft amendments, and relativizes its effects to the detriment of smaller parties, as the disproportion of the received votes and mandates would remain. It also forces voters into changing their original preference for smaller parties, which do not seem to have a chance to
gain parliamentary majority or even parliamentary seats. Also, such electoral system perpetuates the logics of the ‘wasted vote’ always to the detriment of the same parties, even when the latter’s appeal onto the electorate has significantly increased (though not to an extent as high as to override the barriers of the electoral system).15 Therefore, it is questionable whether the objective of political pluralism is ensured. The specific design of this premium for the biggest party implies that votes cast for parties with a completely different political orientation will directly benefit this party. The will of these voters will not be respected. If there is the intention to introduce a premium for the strongest party, for instance, the Constitution could provide that 9/10th of the Parliament seats (i.e. 135 out of 150) shall be distributed to the parties that have received more than 5% of the votes according to the principles of proportional representation, while the remaining 15 seats will be given to the winning party (or the winning party and the second party) as premium.