Second, introducing such ”bargaining” requirements and creating such a high voting threshold to overcome dissenting opinions of the President and the Jogorku Kenesh (especially in the cases (b) and (c) mentioned above), would render the Constitutional Chamber’s constitutional oversight functions – as laid down in Article 97 par 1 - de facto ineffective. The Chamber would no longer adopt decisions that are immediately binding and final, but would essentially be obliged to adopt two decisions – one preliminary conclusion, and one final decision, following extensive consultations with the President and the Jogorku Kenesh. In order to be able to adopt final decisions, in practice, the Constitutional Chamber would need to build a broad consensus internally, which might result in decisions that would often constitute compromise solutions, and not necessarily clear and well-formulated reflections on the constitutionality of a given law. Moreover, in order not to be completely paralyzed, the Constitutional Chamber would also be forced to seek a consensus with the President and the Jogorku Kenesh - both organs that should normally be under the oversight of the Chamber. This would seriously compromise the neutrality of the Chamber’s decisions and subject them to the whims/views of the parliamentary majority, or the President in office at a particular time.