In a certain number of states the Constitution does not determine (exhaustively) the substantial conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to exercise the power to dissolve Parliament. This is the case in Andorra, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In these states the dissolution of the parliament can have many functions: (a) it can be a “conflict dissolution”, aimed at consulting the electorate on a conflict raised between the government and the parliament. Especially in states with a semi-presidential system, with a government appointed by an elected president and accountable to parliament, the power to dissolve can be a strong weapon in the hands of the president especially when the presidential majority and the majority in the Assembly do not coincide. (b) The right to dissolve parliament can also be used to put an end to a political impasse, such as the impossibility of forming a stable new government after a governmental crisis. (c) The right to dissolve parliament also makes it possible to allow the people to express itself on a problem of major importance. (d) Last but not least dissolution can also be an appeal by the president or the Government to the electorate, at a time considered to be favorable for it, e.g. because there are good electoral prospects for the presidential or the parliamentary majority. In this case one can really speak of a power to “choose the date of the election.” Although in the abovementioned states the Constitution itself does not prescribe precisely the conditions that have to be fulfilled to dissolve Parliament, sometimes the dissolution is more or less regulated by unwritten constitutional law or by conventions of the Constitution.