Even if one regarded this as imposing restrictions on the acceptability of remote voting, such restrictions could not be justified by invoking the discretion enjoyed by national legislation. In interpreting the tangible content of the rights and obligations arising from the ECHR, it is necessary to take account of the legal situation in the contracting States if homogeneous rules exist among them. The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a long line of decisions from which it emerges that national authorities have greater scope for discretion where it is impossible to identify a common point of view among the various member States (cf. J. CALLEWAERT, “Quel avenir pour la marge d’appréciation?”, Mélanges à la mémoire de R. Ryssdal, 2001, p. 147 [151]), ECtHR, judgment of 11 July 2002 [Grand Chamber], I v. the United Kingdom, Rec. n° 25680/94, §§ 51 onwards; judgment of 25 November 1994, Stjerna v. Finland, Series A, 299-B, § 29; judgment of 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the Unitedingdom, Rec. n° 28958/95, §§ 74 onwards.). Where the contracting States share a common or homogenous standard on a question or subject related to the ECHR’s guarantees, this tends to favour acceptance of this standard at European level as well, in contrast to situations where no common standard exists. Where there is no common European rule, it would be necessary to deny that there a mandatory ECHR requirement existed at a certain level.