Home > 3.2 Proportional systems > Comparative Report on thresholds and other features of electoral systems which bar parties from access to Parliament
 
 
 
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There are two types of thresholds of exclusion. In some electoral systems the threshold is set artificially, by law. This is known as the legal (or artificial, or formal) threshold. Parties that do not obtain the legally prescribed minimum number of votes do not get any seat. This is an obvious limitation to minor parties, one that often also proves fatal to the survival of such parties. States with legal threshold differ according to the chosen percentage. For the member states of the Venice Commission this range is between the lowest 0.67% (in the Netherlands) to the highest 10% (in Turkey). Based on an analysis of electoral legislation and other sources a list of different legal thresholds across several of the European states was prepared. The list (table) appears at the end of this subsection. However, it also follows from the analysis that any sound conclusions as to the comparative merits of these numbers would have to take into account a complex set of different contexts associated with the numbers. Most obviously, we would have to take into account the thresholds’ different levels of application as appear across different states. Thus, some laws prescribe that a certain amount of votes needs to be obtained at the constituency/district level (e.g. Spain). Others require nation-wide legal thresholds (e.g. Germany), and still other thresholds are meant to apply at both these levels (e.g. Sweden). It is impossible, without further and detailed measurements/calculations of the type used in political science, to assess which of these systems, other things being equal, is at the end more/less favourable to parties’ access, and what the actual degree of that inclusiveness/exclusiveness is. Moreover, there are differences between the countries as to the stage of the threshold’s application: whether the legal threshold is applied to the first, second, or any subsequent rounds of seat allocations. Furthermore, there is the problem of the “graduation of the threshold”: the thresholds differ also in the sense that some numbers apply to parties and others to party coalitions; for example 5 % per parties, 8% per two-party coalitions, 10 % for larger party-coalitions. All these circumstances further complicate a potential comparative assessment of our question (the relative openness/closure of a given system to parties’ access). The same is true of the fact that some states (e.g. Germany) prescribe alternative legal thresholds determined by seats, not percentage. These usually (as in the case of Germany, where winning 3 direct (plurality) seats also suffices to take part in the distribution at the national level) appear in addition to the thresholds determined by percentage. On top of this, there are other details of each system that make the comparative assessment of the threshold effects even more difficult. For instance, in Germany the 5% national threshold plays an important role while the threshold of 3% in Greece has little effect: there, minor parties fail to get elected due to a different cause – the use of fifty-six districts for party lists. Similarly, the 3% legal threshold in multimember districts in Spain may be nearly insignificant. It’s has been reported that it is already the magnitude of the districts in Spain that “does not permit the representation of parties with a share of votes lower than 5 percent”. Another example of the different functioning of the thresholds, due to specificities of each system in which they appear, is this: “a national legal threshold (as in Germany) applied across the whole country limits minor parties such as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), who are strongest in the east but who fell below the 5% level nationally in the 2002 Bundestag election, whereas a district-level legal threshold (e.g. the one used in Spain) will not affect small parties such as the Basque Nationalists, who are returned in their regional strongholds”.


Legal Threshold in Majority/Plurality Systems


Country Legal Threshold
Belarus None
France Either 12.5% support of registered electorate in a district, or to
finish in top two (in first round) to qualify for second round
UK None



Legal Threshold in Combined Systems


Country Legal Threshold
Albania 2,5% for parties and 4 % for coalitions (before the constitutional revision)
Germany Either 5% nationwide or 3 district seats
Hungary 5% of votes in proportional representation tier needed to qualify for any seats from proportional representation tier or national tier
Italy 4%
Lithuania 5%
Russia 5% (when the combined system was applied)
Ukraine 4% (when the combined system was applied)


Legal Threshold in Proportional Systems


Country Legal Threshold
Austria 1 seat in a lowest-tier district, or 4% nationwide, needed to qualify for middle or national tier seats
Belgium 5% of votes needed within a constituency to qualify for seats there
Bosnia and Herzegovina None
Bulgaria 4%
Croatia 5%
Czech Republic 5%
Denmark Parties do not qualify for share of higher tier seats unless they win a lower tier seat, win the equivalent of the Hare quota in two of the three regions, or win 2% of national vote
Estonia 5%
Finland None
Greece 3%
Iceland None
Ireland None
Latvia 5%
Luxembourg None
Moldova 6%
Netherlands 0.67%
Norway 4%
Poland 5%
Portugal None
Romania 5 %
Russia 7 %
Slovakia 5%
Slovenia 4%
Spain 3% of votes needed within a district to qualify for a seat there
Sweden Either 4% national or 12% district
Switzerland None
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” None
Turkey 10%
Ukraine 3 %