The Venice Commission therefore makes the following observations and recommendations:

1. The proposed amendments to the Constitution do not provide sufficient guarantees of the independence and impartiality of the INEC and of the judges of the Electoral Tribunal. 


2. The proposed procedure for direct election of the Councillors of the INEC and judges of the Electoral Tribunal should be reconsidered as it is not in line with the international standards and best practices in the electoral field which prescribe that there should be balanced representation of different political forces in the electoral management bodies (constructed strictly or on a proportional basis). Members of such bodies should be impartial and professionally competent and should therefore not be allowed to campaign (to run as candidates in direct elections).


3. The creation of a highly centralised INEC should be reconsidered since:
   
   
   1. an onerous and complex centralisation might compromise the impartial and independent operation of the electoral administration at different levels of the Federation;
   
   
   2. if the electoral system is changed to a proportional one with 32 constituencies and taking into account the proposed INEC powers, its capacity to intervene during the process of establishment of lists by political parties will be very limited;
   
   
   3. the elimination of lower-level electoral management bodies and the creation of ad hoc structures with temporary staff will have a negative impact on the quality of elections at different levels.
   
   


4. The concentration of the complaints and appeals process in the hands of a national Electoral Tribunal could also be problematic in the light of the federal structure of the Mexican State and will create a potentially very high burden since such national Electoral Tribunal will have to deal with all the electoral complaints and appeals in first instance. The corresponding provisions of the Initiative should be reviewed.