In addition, the high number of members in the REC may cause certain difficulties in its work, as decision-making is prolonged due to longer discussions among a high number of REC members, which may lead to the inability to reach consensus, lack of collegiality, or ineffective sessions in case all members are rightfully given the floor to express their views. EMBs have to make all decisions during elections promptly and decisively. According to Article 18, the members and deputy members of the REC are appointed at the proposal of parliamentary groups proportionately to their representation in the National Assembly. As a safeguard, no parliamentary group may nominate more than half the members of the REC. If a parliamentary group has more than half of the total number of MPs, this group shall nominate the president and seven members of the REC in its standing commission, and the same for deputy members. A party holding a majority in parliament cannot appoint a majority of the members of the REC (8 out of 17), which is positive for the appearance of independence. However, the REC will still largely reflect the proportional representation of the party groups in parliament. Importantly, using party groups (factions) as a criterion may not be an accurate reflection of the distinction between the government majority and the opposition. The important safeguard in Article 17 against the appointment of a majority of members by one party group does not account for cooperation and alliances between party groups, for example, by forming a coalition government. Therefore, the current safeguard does not prevent a formal or informal coalition of parties from nominating a majority of members of the REC. Furthermore, a model which relies solely on political representation in EMBs risks politicisation even when representation is balanced between the government coalition and the opposition.