The existence of independent adjudicating bodies is a fundamental requirement for the effective examination of electoral complaints, which is a legal obligation flowing from Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR and international standards. In the Serbian model for election dispute resolution, the REC decides complaints on the conduct of elections (Article 153), and its decisions can be appealed to the Administrative Court for a final decision (Article 156). This model is common and in line with international standards, provided that the institutions are independent. In this respect, the Venice Commission and ODIHR would like to note that the appearance of independence of the REC may be questioned in its current model of political appointment and representation, see above. As for the Administrative Court, the Venice Commission and ODIHR note that Serbia has adopted constitutional amendments to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. These amendments are also welcome in the context of elections. In its 2007 opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, the Venice Commission concluded that the National Assembly’s role in the appointment of the High Judicial Council that in turn appoints and elects’ judges, constituted “a real threat of a control of the judicial system by political parties”. By design, structural flaws in the judicial system that threatens judicial independence will be present in the election dispute resolution system too. The recent constitutional amendments, aimed at strengthening judicial independence in general, have the potential for a positive effect on election dispute resolution and may improve public trust in the electoral process.