The analysed amendments imply that, if the Central Electoral Commission considers that the behaviour of a person meets one of the criteria referred to in Article 16(2)(f), there is an implicit presumption that they committed illegitimate acts that justify their ineligibility. A person who is found to meet at least one of the criteria for ineligibility, in order to avoid this sanction, has to submit evidence proving “unequivocally” that, before the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the political party, they have tried to determine the party to quit the actions that led it to be declared unconstitutional or they have dissociated publicly from these actions; or evidence proving the dismissal of prosecution against them or their acquittal in the criminal action brought against them (Article 16(23-24)). The Venice Commission and ODIHR note, in the first place, that the required standard of proof is put to the level of being “unequivocal”. “Unequivocal” seems to require a higher level than “beyond reasonable doubt” (as in criminal law) or “on the balance of probabilities” (as in private law), and to rather mean “with certainty”. Proving “unequivocally” is very difficult and could therefore lead to the impossibility in practice for the individual to provide such evidence and potentially to arbitrary and/or disproportionate decisions. This is particularly true when proofs have to be brought about intra-party life: in the intra-party life and decision-making process, individuals very often change their beliefs and behaviours depending on the political environment and dynamics of the political process. The Venice Commission and ODIHR consider that procedural guarantees should be ensured at the two stages of the process – inclusion in the list of persons under Article 16(2)(f) and possible exculpation -: individuals must have a genuine opportunity, first, to contest filling the conditions of Article 16(2)(f), and second, in case they fill them, to refute the evidence against them; the standard of proof should be lowered to only require from the person evidence that brings into question the truth of the presumed facts. Further, the fact that an individual had changed their position – prior to the Constitutional Court’s decision - from in favour to against the criticised party actions should be taken into account.