International standards do not impose nor prohibit in principle ex officio decisions of constitutional courts. Comparative research shows that when constitutional courts have a duty to oversee elections, such a duty does in most cases not imply the power to act ex officio. As the Venice Commission and ODIHR have previously stated, “the electoral law should specify whether the entities vested with the power to invalidate the election results can take action without being presented with a formal complaint.”30 The Venice Commission noted in its 2009 Report on the cancellation of election results that in most countries, judicial bodies are involved in the certification or cancellation of electoral results only on the basis of complaints or appeals.31 In cases where national legislation establishes a general duty of control or a general guarantee function of the constitutional court in relation to elections, it could be argued that such a provision would be inefficient if the constitutional court could not initiate proceedings when it learns of major fraud or abuse in the electoral process. This argument is however perhaps answered by the practical reality that candidates, parties or groups of voters who are dissatisfied with an electoral outcome can be expected to bring forward complaints if there is relevant evidence of fraud or other relevant misconduct or abuse. Moreover, an extensive ex officio competence of the constitutional court could put in question the value of (mostly rather short and strict) time limits for complaints if the instance reviewing the election was free to act ex officio after the time limit has expired.